AL-HAYAT Research Journal

HJRS HEC Journal Recognition System Category Y

Volume 4 Issue 1 (Oct-Dec 2026)

ISSN (Online): 3006-4767
ISSN (Print):: 3006-4759

From Shale Independence to Strategic Competition: U.S. and Chinese Energy Policies in the Middle East

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Abstract

The Middle East is at the heart of the energy security of the United States and China, which are the world's two biggest energy consumers. This research compares their energy policies toward the region, and considers the implications of the differences for regional stability, economic development and U.S. energy policy. The research design adopted is qualitative, comparative research, which uses secondary data that consists of descriptive trend analysis of IEA and EIA statistics (1960-2022), and comparative policy analysis and thematic review of government documents, think-tank report, and academic articles. The findings illustrate that shale oil and gas production reduced petroleum imports from OPEC and the Persian Gulf States for the U.S. after 2005, heightened the U.S. dependence on Canada, and turned the country into a net petroleum exporter around 2019–2020. However, it is clear that the Middle East is nonetheless of strategic interest to Washington in terms of global price stability and political leverage. The U.S. strategy is primarily military, security and bilateral, while China's strategy is economic, infrastructural (Belt & Road) and renewable energy. While Chinese investment incentivizes diversification, U.S. interventions have at times disrupted regional oil production, while a security order is largely being provided by the United States. The paper suggests that Washington has three options: competition, selective cooperation and disengagement and that the best way to postpone the choice is to give Beijing the upper hand.

Key words

Energy security; Middle East; United States energy policy; China energy policy; Belt and Road Initiative; shale revolution

Research Question:

How do U.S. and Chinese energy policies in the Middle East differ, and what do these differences mean for regional stability, economic development, and future U.S. strategy?

Objectives of the Study:

- To characterize the U.S. energy system based on its supply, production and consumption mix (via IEA data).

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- To track U.S. petroleum imports from OPEC, Persian Gulf and Canada between 1960 and 2022 and the path to becoming a net exporter due to the shale boom.
- To make a comparison of America's and China's energy policies in the Middle East.
- To evaluate the impact of these policies on regional stability, energy security and economic development of Middle Eastern countries.

Research Methodology:

This study is a qualitative and comparative descriptive analytical. It contrasts two energy policy strategies, the U.S. and the Chinese policies in the Middle East, on comparable ground the instruments of policy, the stability effects, and the economic effects. The quantitative data used are IEA country energy profiles (supply, production, consumption shares), EIA historical data on petroleum imports (1960-2022), and Statistical primary energy consumption data. Government and congressional documents, think-tank reports (e.g., RAND, Center for a New American Security, Middle East Institute), news agency reports, and peer-reviewed and book literature on energy geopolitics.

Energy system of United States

Country	Energy Supply	Production	Consumption
United States	Coal 11.2% Oil 35.2% Natural Gas 35.4% Nuclear 9.8%	Coal 12.6% Crude Oil 33.6% Natural Gas 36.7% Nuclear 9.8%	Coal 0.9% Oil Products 47.1% Natural Gas 24.0% Heat 0.4% Electricity 21.4%

Source: https://www.iea.org/countries/united-states

Detailed breakdown of energy supply, production, and consumption of the United States in each energy source as tabulated in the table. Below is an analysis of key data of the given data.

- Energy Supply in the United States:

The following table lists the primary energy source in the US.

oil (35.2%): The largest energy source

Coal (11.2%): Declining but still part of the mix

Oil (35.4%): Nearly equal to Natural Gas (35.4%) in supply, thus demonstrates its increasing supply level.

Nuclear (9.8%): A stable, non-carbon source of energy.

The U.S. relies primarily on oil and natural gas, which together account for over 70% of its energy supply. While the U.S. depends much less on coal than China does, advancements in the technology of fracking (hydraulic fracturing) have increased dependence on natural gas in the U.S.

- Energy Production in the United States

Slightly higher than its share in supply, indicating that some coal is exported (12.6%).

A dominant source (33.6%) correlates with a high percentage of U.S. oil production (Crude Oil).

Most of the occurrence of Natural Gas (36.7%) is due to shale gas boom.

Consistent with supply figures and stable production (9.8% nuclear).

As a result, the U.S. is a major oil and gas producer, with shale technology allowing it to greatly decrease its reliance on Middle Eastern imports. However, oil surpassed by natural gas as the first energy source, turns into a fundamental basis of the U.S. energy policy.

- Energy Consumption in the United States

Extremely low usage (0.9%) Reflects a decrease of coal to give space to cleaner alternatives.

The largest share (47.1%) is mainly due to the need for transportation.

It is used for electricity generation, heating, and industry (24.0%).

A minor category (0.4%) is heat from industrial waste.

Electricity (21.4%) accounts for a large share being driven by renewables, nuclear- and gas-powered plants.

Coal consumption being minimal, there was a huge shift from coal energy to cleaner energy sources such as natural gas and renewables. The use of oil in transportation keeps it dominating in the U.S. The increased role of electricity (21.4%) indicates that we depend more and more on its renewable sources and even more on electrification of industry.


The United States implemented significant climate and energy policy changes that have set the nation on a trajectory toward a clean, reliable, and cost-effective energy system to achieve a net zero economy. The reforms seek to enhance the deployment and resilience of infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on manufacturing clean energy, developing varied supply chains, ensuring affordability, promoting equity, and generating high-quality jobs in the clean energy sector.

The United States plays a crucial role in bolstering global energy security as it holds the title of being the largest oil producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas. Thanks to a surge in clean energy investment, the United States currently ranks as the third-largest market worldwide for renewable energy investment, heat pump manufacturing, and electric vehicle sales. Additionally, the US is playing a crucial role in facilitating clean energy transitions globally through its technological leadership (Agency, 2021).

US Energy Policies:

The United States for a long time has been involved in the Middle East mainly due to the big oil reserves which the Middle East possesses and which have been significant for the global energy demand and further to the extent of US energy needs. Historically, the USA has invested a great deal in building up its forces in the region to ensure access to energy and the freedom of petroleum transport. Such entanglement has included associations with the major oil-exporting countries and interference with the political process of other parts of the world's unstable countries that exert influence on these countries. At present, nonetheless, the trends in the American energy policy have been aimed at acquiring higher levels of energy independence. This has been greatly made possible by an increase in the production of shale oil and gas in America reducing the role of Middle Eastern oil. At the same time, there has been more emphasis on renewable energy due to the acclaimed global issue of climate change and efforts towards curtailing emissions of greenhouse gases (Lange, 2018). This is also in concord with the change to renewables at the same time as the diversification of sources of energy and therefore avoiding the geopolitics that come with reliance on oil. However, the Middle Eastern region remains strategically important to the United States of America not only in the provision of natural resources but also in a more political perspective as well. The focus on the stability of the region is considered to be important for the US because the instability can lead to the interruption of the supply of oil that influences the prices for energy resources and the general stability of the economies in the whole world. Thus, diplomacy, economics, and military power have been seen used by the US particularly in the Middle East to maintain supremacy and attain its objectives, thereby showing the position's continuities in the present energy struggle game (Accountability, 2024).

Figure 1



Source: US Energy Information Administration

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The following figure shows the trend in OPEC, Persian Gulf, and Canada U.S. petroleum imports with the total U.S. petroleum imports from 1960 to 2022. The key insights are:

- U.S. Imports of Petroleum (Blue Line)

In the period from 1960 to 2005, there was a steady increase in the total petroleum imports and the figure reached around 14 million barrels per day in the mid-2000s.

Between 2005 and 2008 imports decreased sharply, largely because the advent of shale oil in US oil industry decreased U.S. dependence on foreign oil. From the 2010s to the 2020s, the decline continued to about 7 million barrels a day in 2022.

- Imports from OPEC (Brown Line)

Beginning in the 1970s and through the early 2000s, U.S. imports of crude oil from OPEC nations grew at an exponential rate and peaked around 6 million barrels per day.

The reason for that was that domestic production went down, the demand went up, and this led to more reliance on OPEC oil. Yet since 2010, imports of OPEC fell sharply such that by 2022, U.S. imports of OPEC stood below 2 million barrels per day as the U.S. reduced its reliance on these countries.

- Green Line imports from the Persian Gulf.

Imports of Persian Gulf oil (part of OPEC like Saudi Arabia, Iraq) rose considerably particularly from the 1970s and peaked early in the 2000s.

However, after 2010 imports fell off moving with the broader U.S. trend away from dependency on Middle Eastern oil. During 2022, Persian Gulf imports had become minimal which indicated a strategic shift in U.S. energy policies.


- Imports from Canada (Yellow Line)

Canadian petroleum imports on the other hand trended in the opposite direction rising from the late 1980s to 2022.

Canadian imports kept on increasing, differently from OPEC and Persian Gulf imports, surpassing Persian Gulf and OPEC imports as of 2010. It reflects the U.S. interest in obtaining energy from stable, geopolitically secure energy partners, such as Canada.

During the 1970s to 2000s, the U.S. depended greatly on OPEC and Persian Gulf oil. After 2010, the reduction in reliance upon OPEC and the Middle East was a result of shale oil production and a movement towards importation of oil from Canada. Imports from OPEC and from the Persian Gulf had declined quite sharply by 2022, while Canadian oil had become a major source.

Figure 2



The provided image shows the total US petroleum import from 1960 to 2022, along with its import from OPEC, Persian Gulf, and Canada.

- U.S. Petroleum Imports (Blue Line)

While the imports climbed steadily from 1960 to 2005 to nearly 14 MBD in the mid-2000s.

Imports truly began to decline after 2005, mostly because of the U.S. shale oil boom, which lowered foreign oil dependence. Imports fell to around 7 million barrels per day by 2022 and still hovered in that vicinity going into this year.

- Imports from OPEC (Brown Line)

Imports from OPEC grew sharply from the 1970s reaching more than 6 million barrels per day in the early 2000s.

OPEC imports have been falling sharply since 2010 and below 2 million barrels per day in 2022.

The rise in U.S. domestic oil production and the fall in demand for oil from OPEC nations caused this decline.

- Persian Gulf imports (Green Line):

Similar to OPEC imports, Persian Gulf imports hiked from the 1970s to the early 2000s.

However, they dropped greatly after 2010 as a strategic response to reduce Middle Eastern oil reliance. In the decades by 2022, Persian Gulf imports were at their lowest levels.

- Imports from Canada (Yellow Line)


Unlike the OPEC and Persian Gulf imports, Canadian imports easily rose from the 1980s onward.

By 2010, Canada overtook both OPEC and Persian Gulf nations to become the leading source of the U.S. petroleum imports. The U.S. move toward more stable and secure energy sources was reflected in relatively stable Canadian imports in 2022. As seen in this graph, we see that the United States has transitioned through energy over time.

Pre-2010 Heavy reliance on OPEC and Persian Gulf oil. Increase of U.S. shale oil production and greater dependence on Canadian imports post 2010 result in a major reduction of imports from OPEC and Persian Gulf. By 2022, OPEC and Persian Gulf oil imports had plummeted; imports from Canada overcame their Canadian rivals, becoming Canada's top supplier.

This is part of an effort to achieve U.S. energy independence and an increasing reliance on geopolitically stable energy sources such as Canada.

Figure 3



The informational image indicates U.S. net petroleum imports broken down into the following three groups, from 1960 to 2020:

Crude oil (blue bars)

Refined products and other (orange bars)

It includes hydrocarbon gas liquids (gray bars).

- Growth in Net Petroleum Imports (1960-2005)

Since 1960, the U.S. had steadily increased net petroleum imports to over 12 million barrels per day in the early 2000s before reaching that peak.

The largest part of these imports was crude oil (blue bars), other smaller imports included refined products (orange bars).

- Decline in Net Petroleum Imports (Post-2005)

Net petroleum imports peaked in the mid–2000s but fell considerably afterwards.

In the mid-2010s imports dropped to near zero and by late 2010s the U.S. has even become a net exporter of petroleum (i.e., the data point is negative).

U.S. domestic oil production was boosted by the shale oil revolution and this was a prime contributor to this decline.

- Rise of Hydrocarbon Gas Liquids (2010-Onward)

Arun started appearing in gray bars representing hydrocarbon gas liquids (HGLs) in 2010.

This follows from U.S. growth in exports of byproducts of natural gas processing, propane, and butane HGLs.

- U.S. Becomes a Net Petroleum Exporter (2019-Present)

Net petroleum imports turned negative around 2019, so the US became a net exporter of petroleum for the first time in decades.

The change results from higher U.S. crude oil production and growing exports of refined products and hydrocarbon gas liquids.

A massive transition in the U.S. energy landscape is illustrated on the graph. From high dependence on foreign oil (1960-2005) to Energy independence and net exporter status (2019 onward). This shift was a result of the combined effect of domestic shale oil production, increasing export of refined products and hydrocarbon gas liquids, as well as reduced crude oil imports, paving the way for the U.S. to become a major player in global energy markets (Calabrese, 2019).

China's Energy Policies

Consequent to rapid economic development in China, the energy demand has broadly set the tone of China's energy policy. Interestingly, this is where the Middle East comes into the picture as it has a large volume of oil supply. China depends on Middle Eastern countries for the oil it uses, which makes the region valuable to it (Gering, 2023). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has sought the Middle East as a means of diversifying its energy supplies and as a place to invest in oil assets (Singh, 2021). Undoubtedly, there may not be any other action that has foresighted the development of infrastructure than the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under which China has invested billions of dollars in funding infrastructure projects both domestically and internationally. Some of these ventures include the construction of ports, railways, and energy pipelines for Oil transport and enhancing the economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries (Chaziza, 2019). While the American policy is more on military and political diplomacy, the Chinese policy on energy security in the Middle East is more on economic diplomacy. China prefers to utilize its financial and economic muscles to forge good relations and long-term energy partnerships for business (Rolland, 2017). China has been able to exert more soft power in the area than the use of military power as witnessed in the case of the US. In the same way, China's interest in investing in renewable technologies and its domestic climate change policies also have an impact on its energy policy in the Middle East (Reuters, 2018). Therefore, China aims to diversify the supply of energy and reduce the use of fossil energy and for that support the development of renewable energy projects and green technologies. However, the changing structure and system of global energy provision and utilization have noted the fact that the consistent flow of oil from the Middle East is crucial to China (Tirziu, 2024).

Impacts on Regional Stability and Energy Security

Some of the postures that the US and China have assumed are dimensions concerning the stability and energy security status in the region (Gering, 2023). The American government has thus used the raw power to safeguard balance in some crucial oil-producing countries in a manner that entails: direct deployments, political-military sign-up, and consignment

of ongoing forces. The peculiarity of this strategy is to save the essential facilities and deliver the Oil to the world markets. Such interventions can also involve systems' instabilities and conflicts as has been observed in Iraq and Libya where conflict and regime changes have affected the oil production and export. In the case of China, the orientation is much more on the input and the investment of the development framework in economic development (Wong, 2020). In this regard, infrastructural development, investment in human capital, and economic cooperation, China provides for the enhancement of the region's development and this will help in possibly improved stability. Hence as evidently observed in the case of the ports, railways, and energy pipelines particularly BRI investment in the oil sector, infrastructural investment is not restricted to a means of transport utilization but a form of economic value that is brought into host countries (Dorsey, 2018). Hence this investment can help to employ some human beings and advance the structures improving the steadiness of the economy. Nonetheless, China has not been very active in the promotion of the security structures they depend on the existing structures mainly from the United States and its associates. This dependence could be viewed as the country's weakness if the internal disputes in the regions escalated outside of commerce and economic actions. The strengths and weakness of the two strategies are well illustrated herein; therefore, the overall level of effectiveness of the achievement of regional security and energy security is determined by the parameters that include the political setting, the region's ongoing conflicts, and the global energy market (UBS, 2024).

Economic Development

It is suggested that the US and Chinese energy policies have large impacts on the economic development of Middle Eastern countries. US investments have therefore previously been directed toward the oil sector mainly in extraction, production, and export. This has offered relativity high economic returns to the oil-endow countries but at the same time, it has locked the economy into oil production and consumption thus making it always in a precarious position of volatility of global oil prices. In addition, the concern the oil has also resulted in concentration on this sector and thus slows the process of diversification in the economy. However, Chinese investments in the Middle East are more spread out across sectors and fields. Discussed below are some of the aspects of The Belt and Road Initiative which have experienced massive investment in infrastructure like roads, railways, ports, and energy pipelines. Besides transporting oil, these projects help the economic development of the region. For instance, an increase in infrastructure means that trade is likely to rise, connectivity is going to be better, and in turn, more investors can be expected. Moreover, China's integration of renewable energy and green technologies offers Middle Eastern countries various options for power and energy diversification and minimizing oil dependency. This diversification is important for the long-run development of the region's economy since there may be a change in global trends and a tendency towards switching to the use of renewable energy sources. Thirdly, China's model which is focused on development through infrastructural and industrial advancement is more consistent with the investment in oil. Thus, while the visible part of the American strategy is concerned with the control of and export of oil, Chinese investments support general development, which may be more beneficial for the region's development in the long run (Gering, 2023).

U. S Agreements in the Middle East

Economic partnerships and trade agreements have been crucial tools for the USA in the employment of Middle East strategies. Traditionally US focused on stabilizing energy resources and military cooperation in the region, but China has used its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its economic presence in the Asia Pacific. Middle Eastern countries' energy, infrastructure, and trade, both nations have signed major agreements with those countries (Clinton, 2011).

- U.S. Economic Agreements in the Middle East

Several Middle Eastern nations have long-standing trade and investment relationships with the United States, most especially in the oil and defense sectors. Some key agreements include:

- U.S.-Saudi Arabia Strategic Agreements:

The groundwork for increasing bilateral trade was laid down through the 2003 Saudi U.S Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).

The U.S. inked $350 billion in defense and economic deals with Saudi Arabia, $110 billion arms deal.

Major U.S. companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron have shares in the Saudi Arabian oil and petrochemical industries.

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- U.S.-UAE Trade and Military Cooperation:

Under the strict nonproliferation conditions, the U.S.-UAE Bilateral Agreement (2009) established nuclear energy cooperation.

Washington and the UAE expanded trade, investment, and security ties under the 2020 Abraham Accords. But with more than $20 billion in annual trade, UAE is still the largest U.S. export market in the region.

- U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (1985):

The first US FTA ever with a country, allowing for high-tech, tech, defense, and energy partnerships.

U.S. military aid has amounted to $3.8 billion per annum to Israel and supported its economic and defense sectors.

- U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement (2008):

Cooperation on energy, trade, and military security was established long term.

Halliburton and General Electric are just two of the many U.S. firms that have invested in Iraq's oil, electricity, and infrastructure sectors.

Future action plan

China's Middle East policy appears to be heading in the same general direction. China is progressively allocating more military, political, and economic resources to that region. With the region's strategic importance to Beijing, China seems to be investing very little in it currently; this imbalance will undoubtedly be corrected over time. China's Middle East policy is determined by the interplay of three key factors: In this context, the objectives of the article are the analysis of the current state of the US-China relations, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the impact of these two subjects on its interests. Other factors may also be involved; these are the internal politics of China and the state of the Chinese economy (Clarke, 2019).

However, the policy of China as well as other external powers will be shaped by the United States' approach to the Middle East and China. Two crucial inquiries hold particular significance: Is the US going to pursue a zero-sum approach to relations with China or do the policymakers see cooperation with Beijing as necessary or desirable? Also, in what manner will the United States approach the Middle East as it shifts its emphasis to "Great Power Competition"? The US has a considerable and leading edge in the Middle East which causes resentment but also restricts the role of potential competitors including Russia and China. In the future, Washington will have a range of options to consider. The United States needs to decide whether it wants to keep its competitors out of the region as it did during the Cold War by considering it a vital interest. It also has to find out whether it is willing to engage these rivals in the Middle East to ease the competition or to divide the burden (Scobell, 2018). Also, the United States should ask itself whether it wants to push its competitors to make more investments in the Middle East and divert their attention to secondary issues. This view is in line with the views of most advocates for the strategy that has been branded as one that focuses on great power competition arguing that the United States has been doing this over the past two decades.

If the USA chooses to continue the struggle for power in the Middle East, then two strategic dilemmas will be encountered. At the outset, Washington has to choose between continuing with its long-standing efforts towards the advancement of economic and political liberalization or scaling down or stopping these efforts so as not to push the authoritarian partners towards other less demanding partners like Moscow or Beijing. The allure of embracing a "conformist" attitude is powerful, both because of its simplicity and the United States' lackluster history in advocating for change. Nevertheless, adopting this approach may entail accepting regimes that exhibit afflictions such as corruption and oppressive security forces, which in turn provide openings for the very opponents that the United States aims to oppose, be it powerful adversaries or extremists.

Furthermore, the United States must decide on its approach to how it requests its allies to engage with major competitors in the Middle East, particularly China. This decision making entails choosing between forcing partners to choose between the USA and China as the Trump administration does in its Africa strategy or accepting that increasing ties with China do not have to be at the expense of relations with the USA.

Thus, there are many ways that can be placed in between these two extreme conditions. The Centre for a New American Security has put down the following recommendations that the United States can take to address China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These recommendations primarily involve collaborating with allies in areas such as defense, commerce,


and technology. Additionally, they emphasize the need to tackle issues like corruption and the lack of infrastructure financing, which provide China with advantageous opportunities (Kliman, 2018).

Furthermore, the United States has the option to engage in collaboration with Beijing in the Middle East, in addition to this strategy. However, Washington should maintain realistic expectations for these collaborative endeavors. The successful ones have been either limited in scope, like joint counter-piracy patrols, or exaggerated in their significance, like the cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal, which only came to fruition when the United States made significant concessions to the Iranian and Chinese stances. Enhanced collaboration between Washington and Beijing does not necessarily depend on increased trust. However, joint endeavors in the region could serve as a means to cultivate greater trust in the bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, this would require Beijing to prioritize the establishment of trust over its competing inclination to weaken the United States.


If the United States opts to remain passive in the region, then it should not necessarily expect China to take over the region. This would surely force China to either develop or accelerate the development of power projection capabilities that are at par with the ones they are currently depending on the United States. Still, it is crucial to note that these competencies can be used in other regions comparable to the United States and not only the Middle East. The Chinese efforts to secure their energy needs are likely to provide Beijing with more leverage over the energy security of other countries, especially the East Asian countries that obtain their oil imports from the Middle East. Nonetheless, it is rather unlikely that China would follow the American model in the region since it is based on the post-WWII backdrop of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union which encompassed both geo-political and geo-ideological aspects. China is more likely to allow the region to function autonomously in a way that is most beneficial to China and with the most useful regional partners, primarily Iran. Unfortunately, the United States still has to come to terms with the understanding that the Chinese actions in the Middle East will affect the world. It is not entirely clear whether Washington and its democratic partners need or want to fight for every inch of territory in the world. However, it is difficult to uphold commercial and diplomatic standards in one location if they are abandoned in another (Ali, 2018).

Maintaining the current situation, which is marked by a significant presence of the United States but an undetermined level of commitment, would be a strategy that carries substantial costs, and risks, and offers little benefits. The perception that the United States is showing hesitation causes its partners to take precautions and potentially strengthen their ties with Moscow and Beijing. It also gives foes the impression that the US can be easily pushed aside, so endangering US personnel. Furthermore, this will probably prompt China to recognize the necessity of intensifying its diplomatic and military engagement in the area, hence heightening the likelihood of escalated tensions between the United States and China if Washington ultimately chooses not to withdraw. Washington holds the primary responsibility for deciding whether or not to engage in competition with China in the Middle East. Postponing or evading this decision effectively results in transferring that responsibility to Beijing.

Table 1:



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Source: "https://www.statista.com/statistics/263455/primary-energy-consumption-of-selected-countries/"

Primary energy consumption represents the total energy used in a country, regarding:

I. Coal, oil, and natural gas are fossil fuels.

II. Renewables (solar, wind, hydro)

III. Nuclear Power

The graph shows showing total energy consumption for different countries in exajoules (EJ) or million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe).

- China and the United States Lead Consumption

The massive population and industrial segment in China generally make it the largest consumer of primary energy.

High energy use in the residential, manufacturing, and transportation areas within the United States results in the United States following.

- India's Rising Energy Demand

Urbanization and industrialization have gradually increased India's primary energy consumption.

- Russia and Middle Eastern Countries Rely on Fossil Fuels

As a big oil & gas producer Russia's consumption levels are also very high, mostly fueled by fossil fuels.

Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia also show high consumption due to oil production and energy-intensive industries.

- European Countries Have Lower Consumption

The U.S. and China consume more than Germany, the UK, and France at least partly because of energy efficiency measures and renewable energy adaption.

- Japan and South Korea Depend on Energy Imports

These countries import large quantities of energy since they have no domestic fossil fuel resources.

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