Imām Abū Ḥanīfah's Retracted Opinions on Divorce (Revocable): A Scholarly and Analytical Study in a Juristic and Psychological Context

Abstract

This research examines the marjūʿ ʿanhā aqwāl (retracted opinions) of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah (رحمه الله) on divorce (ṭalāq), with particular reference to revocable divorce, in light of authoritative Ḥanafī juristic sources. Divorce in Islamic law is recognised as a permissible but discouraged act due to its profound effects on families, social structures, and the psychological wellbeing of individuals and children. Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, renowned for his intellectual depth and juristic reasoning, initially advanced several opinions on divorce and related issues such as īlāʾ (oath of abstinence), liʿān (mutual imprecation), ʿiddah (waiting period), nafaqah (maintenance), and nasab (lineage). However, after deeper deliberation and consideration of stronger evidences, he revised some of his earlier rulings. This study argues that such retractions do not reflect inconsistency, but rather demonstrate the refinement of jurisprudential reasoning grounded in the Qur’ān, Sunnah, the verdicts of the Companions, and established legal principles. They reveal Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s intellectual honesty, methodological rigour, and readiness to yield to stronger proofs when presented. By analysing these revised rulings, the research underscores the dynamic and evolutionary character of Islamic jurisprudence and the adaptability of the Ḥanafī school. The findings highlight the significance of recognising juristic retractions not only for a nuanced understanding of Islamic legal flexibility but also for addressing the psycho-social dimensions of divorce alongside its legal aspects. The study concludes that Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s approach provides a valuable model for contemporary jurists in engaging with new and complex issues, balancing fidelity to foundational sources with openness to refinement.